The literature on regional disparities in China is both broad and deep. Nonetheless much of its focus has been on the effects of trade liberalization and national policies toward investment in interior provinces. Few pieces have examined whether the disparities might simply be due to differences in industry mix, final demand, or even interregional trade. Using multiregional input-output tables and disaggregated employment data, we decompose change in labor productivity growth for seven regions of China between 1987 and 1997 into five partial effects-changes in value added coefficients, direct labor requirements, aggregate production mix, interregional trade, and final demand. Subsequently we summarize the contributions to labor productivity of the different factors at the regional level. In this way, we present a new perspective for recent causes of China's interregional disparity in GDP per wroker.
INTRODUCTION
As GDP has soared, interregional income disparity has become a major policy challenge in China due to increasing concerns about social stability (Démurger, 2001) .
From 1952 to 2006, China's GDP grew at an annual average rate of 7.9 percent and even more rapidly during the last three decades-9.6 percent annually from 1978 to 2006. The share of GDP produced by provinces in coastal China, its central part, and its extreme west over the same period reveals some growth imbalance. While the coastal provinces were designated open coastal cities. Preferential policies were given in tax, projects and foreign exchange to attract foreign investment and business and these places have become a window of China's opening to the outside world and regarded as "growth pole" for the economy of whole China. Whether or not these policies actually caused the subsequent growth remains unclear, but particularly strong growth ensued in the coastal economies nonetheless. Of course, this growth also exacerbated pre-existing regional income disparities. In response to the deepening interregional income disparities, China's national government proposed the development strategy for different regions in China based on their history and situation. China proposed West Development Strategy in 1999, the polices in the West is mainly for increasing the capital input, improving the investment environment such as infrastructure, deepening the reform and opening, strengthening the supporting of technology, education and human resource. In 2002, China proposed Revitalization of the Traditional Industrial Bases in Northeast China, more emphasis is laid on institutional innovation, with the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, upgrading industry structure and promoting modern tertiary industry, creating jobs for the unemployed and providing social security, promoting sustainable development of resource-based cities, developing modern agriculture and so on. In 2004 Central China Rising was proposed, the policies for traditional industrial bases will be according to those in Northeast and other underdeveloped places according to polices in West of China. The policies are supposed to help promote establishment of grain production base, energy's raw material base, modern equipment manufacturing base and hi-tech industry base in Central China.
Literature investigating the causes of interregional disparity in China has cited specific likely causes of the increasing differences in per capita GDP across regions.
Some factors that have been tested are differences in the infrastructure development like the network of transportation and telecommunication (Démurger 2001) , the source, size and sectoral allocation of fixed investment (Wei 2000) , the speed in the adoption of new technology, level of human capital stock (Liu and Li 2006) , the accessibility to foreign direct investment and international trade (Sun and Parikh, 2001, Wei and Wu, 2001) , the labor market distortions in particular Hukou system impedes labor mobility from rural to urban (Cai et al. 2002) , and province-specific public policy strategies (Yang, 2002 , Lin and Liu, 2005 , Kanbur and Zhang, 2005 , Démurger et al., 2002a .
Most of the research cited in the last paragraph adopts a neo-classical economic growth approach applying the hypothesis that productivity is converging across the regions analyzed. Few pieces have examined whether the disparities and any convergence across them might simply be due to differences and changes in industry mix, in interregional trade, or even in the composition of final demand. Li and Haynes (2008) use shift-share method to analyze China's regional disparity at province level from an industry structure point of view. The fact that China's industries are interdependent as expressed in input-output (I-O) parlance has nearly been completely overlooked. Keidel (2007) seems to be the exception. He forwards the notion that China's growth success has not been so much led by a surge in exports but instead by fluctuations in domestic demand.
We take a different tack in our analysis of Chinese interregional productivity; we use the country's 1987 and 1997 multiregional input-output (MRIO) tables with seven regions, disaggregated employment data, and a decomposition approach introduced by Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) . This approach decomposes productivity into five partial effects-changes in value added coefficients, direct labor requirements, aggregate production mix, technology change, interregional trade and final demand.
2 Subsequently we summarize the contributions to labor productivity of the different factors at the regional level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our research approach.
Section 3 is a general description of data used in this paper.
In Section 4, we analyze the results of our decomposition. A final section concludes the paper.
RESEARCH APPROACH
There are many ways to examine the likely causes of productivity change. We are particularly interested to learn the multifarious guises China's economic reforms sported in affecting interregional income disparity. Was technological change a major player?
How about changes in interregional trade? Perhaps the disparity was enhanced by the degree to which different sectors managed to discover ways outside of technological change to save on labor costs. How much did margin reducing pressures of international trade affect per capita GDP across regions? Were most of the disparities introduced via manufacturing, which is what is largely traded, or did other sectors play a role? After considering the sorts of issues we were interested in answering, it became that the multiplicative decomposition method introduced by Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) was best.
The following presents Dietzenbacher et al.'s approach, as we adopted it. Let N be the number of industries in each region and C be the number of regions. can be written as:
-1 (• represents elementwise multiplication), we can get the final decomposition of labor productivity change: There is an obvious index-number problem here, so the other polar decomposition is expressed as follows:
When we decompose for each region and industry, we replace the vectors and in
Equations (1) and (2) by diagonal matrices with the same elements on the main diagonal and zeroes elsewhere, and premultiply all numerators and denominators with (1×NC) aggregation vectors, one for each region or industry. 
DATA
The data used in our paper are multiregional input-output (MRIO) tables of China in 1987 (Ichimura and Wang, 2003) was produced using hybrid techniques with interregional trade flows based on survey data. 3 We were forced to undertake some procedures to make them comparable.
Prior to the present paper, others have used these two sets of MRIO tables. Meng and Qu (2007) have used them to decompose gross output growth, rather than labor productivity change. They focused upon the nature of interregional relationships, however. They highlighted the performance of China's industrial and regional development policies on the magnitudes of interregional spillovers and feedbacks, which is a rather different focus from that we present here. Hioki and Okamoto (forthcoming) also the same tables, but they applied a qualitative input-output approach to identify changes in the largest spatial linkages among China's main regions since undertaking reforms. In sum, while the two tables have some compatibility problems, there two research groups showed that the worst of them can be overcome in a satisfactory manner.
To make some limitations to our study clear, we start by explaining how we dealt with differences in region definitions across the two MRIO tables. There were altogether seven regions in 1987 and eight in 1997. Thus, in the 1997 accounts we aggregated the North Municipalities with North Coast, the result of which conformed with the North China region in the geography of the 1987 MRIO accounts (see Table 1 for details).
Another change between 1987 and 1997 in Chinese political geography was that in 1987
Chongqing was included within Sichuan province, while in 1997 it was a separate municipality directly under the central government. Fortunately within the I-O accounts this was not an issue since both are assigned to the Southwest region in both years. But a discrepancy does arise in the assignment of Inner Mongolia to regions in the MRIO accounts: it belongs to North China in 1987 but to the Northwest in 1997. Unfortunately, we have no way to correct for this problem since more detailed region classifications are lacking. We proceeded as if this was not an issue. Since Inner Mongolia is economically rather small. 4 Of course, there was the prospect that it could produce some bias in our results.
As for the sector classification, there were 9 industries in 1987 MRIO table and 17 in 1997 MRIO table. We also faced the additional constraint of needing employment counts in order to measure labor productivity by industry and region in both 1987 and 4 We found that Inner Mongolia comprised 23.5% of the Northwest's GNI in 1997 and 8% of North China's GDP in 1987. Thus the shift in Inner Mongolia's economic alliance is more likely to lead to bias in the analysis of the Northwest than it is to our analysis of North China. However, the bias is not expected to be so large since much of difference made by the different scheme of regional (sectoral) aggregation are averaged out when we work with input-output coefficients (Hioki and Okamoto, forthcoming) .
1997. Unfortunately, we could only get labor data for five more aggregated industries by region over the period of study. Referring to the construction of the trade coefficient matrices T A , we assign the trade coefficient to be zero when the use of an industry's output by an industry is zero;
we assign the same value as the corresponding trade coefficient for the other year when the total use was zero in one year but positive in the other. This implies in these situations that all labor productivity will be attributed to changes in the input structure and none to change in trade structure when all other values remain equal. The appendix explains that how we get the deflator for each industry.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics
Labor productivity is defined as value added per unit of labor input. We divided the value added by the corresponding employment 5, 6 data from China Statistical Yearbook 7 for 1987 and 1997, respectively. The employment data we used measures the total persons employed within the region and sector during the corresponding year. 5 The employees refer to all the persons working in government agencies of various levels, political and party organizations, social organizations, enterprises and institutions, and receiving wages or other forms of payment. They include fully employed staff and workers, re-employed retirees, teachers in schools run by the local people, foreigners and Chinese compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan working in various units, part-time employees, employees of other units working temporarily at current posts, and employees holding the second job, but exclude staff and workers who have left their working units while keeping their labor contract (employment relation) unchanged. This indicator reflects the total number of laborers actually engaged in production or other operations in various units. 6 According to China's statistical data change, the employment of management of water conservancy is included in farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water conservancy industry (in agriculture sector) in 1987 and in geological prospecting and water conservancy (in service sector) in 1997, but its share is quite small. Tables 3 and 4 show general information on labor productivity for sectors and regions. Table 3 focuses on sector figures, and Table 4 more on regions. Figure 2 is the growth rate by sector by region. Table 3 shows that labor productivity levels were quite different across sectors and that big differences existed among regions even within the same industry.
Of the sectors we examine, Manufacturing had the highest of labor productivity both in 1987 and 1997. It is followed by Trade and Transportation, Service, Construction, and Agriculture in 1987. While in 1997, the labor productivity in Service, Construction,
Trade and Transportation rank second, third, and fourth, respectively. This shows the basic transition in China's economic development during the period toward Services.
We use the dispersion coefficient (standard deviation divided by the mean) to enable comparisons in the productivity across regions. Using it, we find that Agriculture's productivity varied most across the seven regions in both 1987 and 1997.
This is unsurprising since a basic criterion for regional definitions used in the MRIOs was the geography of Agriculture, which relies on natural endowments. All five sectors have increased in this measure for productivity from 1987 to 1997. This indicates that China's economy has experienced increasing disparity among regions even within these major sectors. This phenomenon is confirmed by much other economic research on China.
During the period, China's economy was undergoing some reforms as the fully centrally planned economy transformed to more of a market economy. Thus the path of labor productivity was quite different across regions. In 1987 among the seven regions, Northeast China had among the highest productivity in almost every one of the five sectors, but by 1997 South and North China made rapid progress in one or two of them.
East China had the highest labor productivity for Trade and Transportation sector in both years. This likely reflects the fact that economic development focused more along the coasts of China during reformation. As we know, some preferential policies had been implemented for the Coast by then. 
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We also should note that the high dispersions of labor productivity levels within the same sector among regions are likely due to the very different mix of industries below the sector level used in our analysis, rather than to a strong variety of labor productivity levels of single products. Given the high level of aggregation in the MRIO tables, we often had to remind ourselves of this fact, particularly when analyzing results for the Manufacturing and Service sectors. Both are aggregates of a large number of heterogeneous industries. Also in the course of the analysis we found ourselves recalling the sage advice of Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) that sectors with the highest productivity levels ought not to be automatically interpreted as being the technologically most advanced. This is because labor productivity levels are also affected by capital-labor ratios that partly depend upon relative factor prices. Thus, we often found that the employment share of the sector with the lowest labor productivity level among the five sectors was greater than the one with highest labor productivity. This implies that labor productivity can increase with regional specialization, which causes the demand for labor to decrease. Table 3 , maintains a relatively low growth rate throughout the period, despite a higher initial labor productivity endowment.
From Figure 2 we can see that almost all sectors in every region experienced positive labor productivity growth rates during the study period. An exception is Trade and Transportation. Labor productivity for that sector even decreased across five of the regions. The reason for this may be manifold. First, it can probably be attributed to inaccuracies in China's statistical system. Hioki and Okamoto (forthcoming) point out some problems about China's statistical information system for transportation industry, in particular they focus upon the consistency between transportation statistics and other national economic statistics. Second, the Trade and Transport sector itself in general does not appear to produce high amounts of value added per unit of production compared with the other four sectors. Also, since data on total hours worked by sector were not available, the employment data we use represents the total number of workers engaged in the industry including temporary employees. Thus, the issue could be more fundamental.
That is, it may well be that, as elsewhere in the world, the sector experienced a rapid increase in its use of part-time and seasonal employees. This would, of course, lead to some bias in our analysis.
For North China, the Service sector is of vital importance. It experienced an increase in its labor productivity growth of more than 100% during the period of study, although several other sectors also have such strong performance. ascertained what contributed to the total change. The following decomposition analysis is our attempt to make this determination.
Decomposition results
The results of the application of decomposition for Equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 5 and 6. Table 5 displays the perspective of regions by aggregating sectors, and Table 6 focuses on sectors by aggregating regions.
Based on the MRIO data, labor productivity in China increased by 90.8 percent during the 1987-1997 period-an annualized growth rate of 6.7%. The increase was mainly caused by a decrease in labor used per unit of gross output. It alone accounts for an increase in productivity of 90.7 percent (the geometric average of the two decompositions). This effect was partly offset by a shrinking of value added's share of total inputs-a reduction of about 20 percent.
The decrease of labor input per unit of gross output indicates the adoption of labor-saving processes, which resulted in the substitution of capital for labor or reductions in disguised unemployment. Much of the change was undoubtedly induced via market pressures as China engaged more fully in the world marketplace as suggested by Tybout (1992) and the many other researchers engaged in work on the exports under a regime of heterogeneous establishments.
Although not directly detectable from the results in Table 5 , we should note that the length of the work week was substantially reduced in 1994 and again in 1995. Prior to March 1, 1994, the work week was 48 hours long; on that date it was reduced to 44 hours.
The official work week was reduced by 4 hours more to 40 hours starting on May 1, 1995.
This means that if one is really interested in measures of labor productivity growth and labor input per unit of gross output that are based on a labor-hour rather than a job basis, the numbers in Table 5 and Table 6 are clear underestimates. We should note that value added per unit of gross output was, in many cases, also caused by the same labor-saving effect as well as being laid open to the ravages of pressures from increasing exposure to world markets. In particular, the latter undoubtedly induced tax and profit shares in China to decrease between 1987 and 1997, by about 5 percent.
Changes in input structure (factor 3) and in final demand (factor 5) have a net positive effect on the growth of labor productivity. While changes in interregional trade (factor 4) seems to have yielded no contribution to the labor productivity at national level, change in final demand provided a greater impetus for labor productivity growth than did change in intermediate input structure-i.e., change in technology and in the mix of industries within each sector. 2. First columns of each factor refer to results of Equation (1) and second columns refer to results of Equation (2) and third columns refer to Fisher indexes, which is the geometric average of the first two indexes. 2. First columns of each factor refer to results of Equation (1) and second columns refer to results of Equation (2) and third columns refer to Fisher indexes, which is the geometric average of the first two indexes.
The findings summarized for each of the seven regions are quite similar to those for the China as a whole. Decreased labor input per unit of gross output contributes the most to labor productivity growth followed by changes in final demand. Input structure tends to rank third and fourth as a key factor. Reduction in the ratios of value added per unit of gross output markedly dampened the labor productivity increases.
Our result differ quite a bit from those of Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) When we look at the factors by region, it can be inferred that the high labor productivity growth in North China, East China, and South China derives largely from large decreases in the use of labor per unit of gross output. In the same three regions plus the Southwest, changes in intermediate input structure also improved labor productivity by about 10 percent. Interregional trade had a clear positive effect on North China, South
China and Central China -about 1.3, 4.5 and 2.5 percent. But it had negative effects on Northeast, East China, Northwest, and Southwest and-about 2, 3, 4 and 3 percent, respectively.
We made several cursory investigations as attempts to explain why the interregional trade effects were positive for some regions while negative for others.
Unfortunately, each approach only supported a subset of the regions. In one approach we examined each region's in-and out-flows with imports calculated from perspectives of both using and producing industries. Analyses of these data revealed that Manufacturing was by far the dominant trading sector for all regions in both periods. We also compare the change in labor productivity of in-and outflows (calculated for using industries using a weighted average) for the sectors by region. We hypothesized that regions' sectors with higher labor productivities for their outflows than their inflows should yield positive effects on labor productivity and, of course, that opposite results should yield negative productivity effects. It proved to be the case for five of the seven regions: East China and Central China were anomalies. We also calculate each sector's outflow share by region with the hypothesis that interregional trade effects would be positive when the outflow's share in high-productivity sectors increases between 1987 and 1997. Again, for all but East China the hypothesis appeared to ring true. Thus despite a modicum of success our search for explanations of the results obtained, it is clear that some further research is required to ascertain more precisely what factors contributed to the interregional trade effects we obtained.
Factor 5, change in final demand, has a major effect on all the regions but the Northeast. We found that, from 1987 to 1997, the Northeast's final demand share in
Trade and Transportation increased from 1.6 percent to 7.4 percent. As we mentioned above, labor productivity of this sector decreased. Thus, it may be a major reason that the effect of final demand is less important in Northeast.
From Table Although it is negative and, hence, dampened productivity growth.
As has been the story throughout this paper, the input structure and changes in final demand had smaller effects compared with the first two factors. Their magnitudes are, nonetheless, significantly larger than the corresponding factors for the Euro-6 countries during the 1975-1985 period, as estimated by Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) . The effects of these two factors are negligible for Agriculture, but make up about 2.4 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively, of productivity change for Manufacturing and about 1.6 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, of productivity change for Transportation and
Trade. Input structure had no apparent effect on the productivity of Construction, which implies that there was no significant technology change in the China's Construction sector during the study period. Changes in the pattern of interregional trade almost had no effect on the productivity of the sectors; there may be some explanations for this.
Construction and Service sectors do not generally produce a traded good or service. Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) also give some reasons for this in their paper. Compared to other sectors, change in final demand for the Service sector contributed most to overall sectoral productivity growth, and at 2.9 percent change in its input structure also yielded relatively large effects compared to other sectors.
Comparing Table 5 to Table 6 , we can make further inferences. The first two factors tend to yield the largest effects, while effects from the last three factors tend to be smaller. The lack of effect from changes in input structure is readily explained by the generally slow pace of technology change within a ten-year timeframe. Work by Carter (1970) and others have long suggested that ten years is insufficiently long to change average industry structure even in innovative industries. That the factors have more effect upon regions than upon sectors implies that different intrasectoral structures exist across the regions and, thus, that subsector mix issues generate some substantial share of the regional disparity in labor productivity.
Along the way we have compared our results for China with those by Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) for the Euro-6 countries. Doing so gives us some measure for comparison and enlightens us about the relative magnitude of labor productivity growth as well as provides some background for identifying further causes of interregional disparities in productivity growth. In summary we have found that all factors tended to provide impetus for labor productivity growth in China between 1987 and 1997 than they did in Euro-6 countries from 1975 to 1985. This finding was most poignant for input structure, interregional trade, and final demand changes. These key differences could have more to do with the way the tables were built rather than from the economic changes that the two global regions were undergoing during the respective study periods. Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) note that the input-output tables they used were constructed using exchange rates among the countries rather than purchasing power parity (PPP)
conversions. Since our analysis focuses on regions of a single country, PPP versus exchange-rate conversion is a non-issue. For similar reasons, transaction costs of trade among regions of a single country are naturally smaller than they are for trade among different countries. That is, the flow of commodities and services should be relatively frictionless for China, which is not the case for the Euro-6. Thus, China's economic reformation, which started in 1978, had better ability to induce sweeping technology change during the second decade following that reform that did the formation of the European Union. Most studies of technology change have been undertaken in relatively stable economies or in economies in decades when trade and information exchange were slower on the uptake.
CONCLUSIONS
Few papers have studied the factors contributing to changes in labor productivity with multiregional input-output tables. This is particularly the case for China. In this paper we use two multiregional input-output tables and disaggregated employment data to examine change in labor productivity growth for seven regions and five sectors of the Chinese economy between 1987 and 1997. We decompose the potential causes of change in labor productivity into five partial effects. We find that the increase of labor productivity for regions and sectors in China mainly comes from the decreasing labor input per unit of gross output and from changes in value added's share of gross output.
Aggregate production mix, interregional trade, and final demand also have important but smaller effect on most of regions and their sectors in China.
We found that the factor effects were larger by region than by industry. This suggests that regions' subsector industry mixes also play a role in causing interregional disparities in GDP production. The paper also shows that all the factors displayed larger effects in China from 1987 to 1997 then did Euro-6 countries from 1975 to 1985.
Like other decomposition methods, this approach deals only with proximate causality, and thus we give our understanding based on the knowledge of institutions, history, policy, and so on. Due to relatively poor economic statistical reporting, especially for the early years, we can only present a rather aggregate decomposition of China's labor productivity among regions and sectors. Accordingly, some in-depth and moredetailed insight may not be detected. Nonetheless, our analysis presents a fresh perspective on an issue of national and possibly even international interest. We therefore hope our work induces others to make further investigations into China's interregional disparities in producing GDP when higher quality data are readily available. Paper and printing Products of year-by-year price index of paper industry
APPENDIX
Index from "ex-factory price indices of industrial products by industry." There is no printing index from China's database and it is probably a common sense that the index of printing is similar with that of paper industry, we just use the price index of paper industry as that of the sector. 7
Chemical products Weighted average of the following 6 industries: petroleum refining and coking, chemical raw material and products, medical and pharmaceutical products, chemical fibers, rubber products and plastic products
Index from "ex-factory price indices of industrial products by industry." The machinery sector include both the general and special machinery industries, yet China only publish the price index for special machinery, we then use it as a price index for the whole sector for we believe they are almost approximate based on our practical experience. 11
Transportation equipment Product of year-by-year index Index from "ex-factory price indices of industrial products by industry" Index from "ex-factory price indices of industrial products by industry" 14 Electricity, gas and water supply
Weighted average of electricity and water industry
Index from "ex-factory price indices of industrial products by industry". The employment data for gas is only available from 1993 to1996 because the data before is included in the industry of coking industry. The worker percentage for gas industry of the whole sector from 1993 to 1996 is 7.2%, 7.3%, 7% and 6.6% respectively, which shows a weighted average of price index from electricity industry and water industry is feasible. Though we don't have the data for years from 1986 to 1992, we can infer the percentage will be no more than that for the latest four years because the volume of gas supply in 1986-1992 mostly is less or equal to that in 1993-1996. Given that the technology for producing gas almost does not change, it is easy to prove the worker percentage will be less or equal to 7%. table, we used it directly: Otherwise, we generated a price index based on weighting of several finer industries' indices. As weights we used GDP share for agriculture and tertiary industries.
Due the greater detail in the manufacturing industries and the lack of equivalently detailed GDP data, we used worker shares. We used base-year shares as weights.
Industrial reporting in China changed during the ten years that we study. For example, the foraging industry was a distinct industry before 1993: It was merged subsequently into the food-processing industry. Similarly, the coke-making industry was a distinct industry before 1990 and was subsequently merged into the petroleum-refining and coke-making industry. The industrial arts industry was included within the "other manufacturing" industry prior to 1990 and was reported separately afterward. All of these anomalies were accounted for inasmuch as data permitted.
In several cases, we were forced to use a combination of data on manufacturing 
